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Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of
Secondary-Management Agency Costs
Steven L. Schwarczt
Corporate governance scholarship has long focused on conflicts of
interest between firms and their top executive officers. This Essay contends that
increasing leverage and financial complexity make it important for scholars
also to focus on conflicts of interest between firms and their secondary
managers.
Introduction
I have recently argued that financial market failures can be attributed, in
large part, to three causes: conflicts, complacency, and complexity. This
Essay engages the first cause, focusing on a subset of conflicts that in the past
has been regarded as relatively harmless: conflicts between a firm and its
middle- to lower-level management (hereinafter "secondary management" or
"secondary managers"). The Essay's thesis is that, as financial markets and the
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co-sponsored by the Yale Journal on Regulation and the Yale Law School Center for the Study of
Corporate Law, as well as William Bratton and Deborah DeMott, for valuable comments, and Nikhil S.
Palekar and Arman Tasheneff for excellent research assistance.
1 Systemic financial market failures also can be attributed to a type of tragedy of the
commons: because the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market
participants whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are distributed among an
even wider class of persons, market participants have insufficient incentives to internalize their
externalities. Therefore, even in a simple financial system with no conflicts and hyper-diligent market
participants (that is, a financial system with none of the causes of failure indicated infra note 2 and
accompanying text), systemic risk is theoretically possible. Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the
'Subprime' Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract_id=1288687 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Understanding the
'Subprime' Financial Crisis]. For a general analysis of systemic risk, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic
Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk].
2 Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets]. Running
throughout these causes is a fourth cause, cupidity; but because greed is so ingrained in human nature
and so intertwined with the other causes, it adds little insight to view it separately.
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securities traded therein become more complex and as firms become more
highly leveraged, these conflicts are increasingly likely to trigger the collapse
of firms that invest in those securities and possibly also of the markets
themselves.
Corporate governance scholarship has long grappled with conflicts of
interest between a firm (meaning its owners, typically shareholders) and the
firm's top managers, such as chief executive officers. Costs associated with this
conflict are referred to as agency costs because managers are agents of the firm.
It is widely acknowledged that top managers sometimes act to benefit
themselves, to the detriment of the firm. 3 To mitigate these agency costs,
corporate governance scholars traditionally focus on two topics: (1) reducing
4top-management conflicts of interest, and (2) improving board governance.
Scholars have largely ignored, however, conflicts of interest between a
firm and its secondary managers.5 There appear to be several reasons for this
oversight. Most obviously, secondary managers report to, and thus are already
theoretically subject to control by, top managers. Moreover, to the extent
decisions of secondary managers are not deemed to be pivotal to the direction
of a firm or its strategic goals, the consequences of secondary-management
conflicts would not be deemed-and in the past probably were not-
significant.
This Essay contends that the increasing complexity of financial markets
and of the securities traded therein makes secondary managers more likely to
3 The classic text is ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (arguing that although shareholders rely on the board of directors to
represent their interests, boards become so dominated by the management over time that their
supervisory role becomes ineffective, especially where there is a collective action problem, that is, the
cost of supervision outweighs the benefits for small stakeholders). Subsequent scholars have extended
these arguments to conflicts with top managers, such as CEOs. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Academic
in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2008) ("Berle and Means are still right: the status quo is not director
primacy, shareholder primacy, or team production, but CEO primacy-govemance by managers largely
for their own benefit."); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major
Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 350 (2000) ("Berle and Means thus concluded that
the decision as to who was to be nominated was made by the CEO himself, or at least under his direct
oversight or control."); Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Independent Board of Directors and Governance in
the United States: Where Is It Heading?, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 725, 734 n.34 (2006) ("Per the Berle and
Means theory on separation of ownership and control, control of the board of directors ultimately resides
in management (if not the CEO)....").
4 Dent, supra note 3 (framing the current debate on agency costs in corporate governance as
one concerned mostly with boards and CEOs); see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Oliver Williamson,
Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984). These works focus exclusively on top management
and boards of directors.
5 A few scholars, though, have pointed out that current compensation schemes dissuade
analysts from downgrading securities on a timely basis or from pricing securities correctly. E.g., Roni
Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst
Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 654 (1999); H.D. Vinod, Conflict of Interest Economics and
Investment Analyst Biases, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 69, 72 (2004).
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act in conflict with interests of their firms, and that the increasing financial
leverage of firms in the modem credit economy exacerbates the consequences
of these conflicted actions. The Essay therefore argues for the importance of
reducing secondary-management conflicts of interest.
The Essay's scope is limited to conflicts of interest between firms and
secondar7 managers that could trigger the collapse of firms or financial
markets. Secondary managers likely to have that power include those who
structure, sell, or invest in market securities on behalf of the firm, such as
analysts responsible for making decisions about the firm's investments.
Similarly, the types of firms likely to suffer serious adverse effects from these
conflicts include banks or other financial institutions whose assets are
significantly invested in, or whose business is significantly concerned with
structuring or selling, financial-market securities. 7 This Essay's examples will
therefore concentrate on secondary managers who structure, sell, or invest in
market securities on behalf of financial institutions. Nonetheless, portions of
this Essay might well have application to secondary managers in other types of
firms.
8
6 Thus, the Essay does not examine conflicts of interest (I) that are not between firms and
secondary managers or (2) that could not trigger the collapse of firms or financial markets. The former
category includes conflicts in the originate-to-distribute model of loan origination, conflicts between
servicers and investors, conflicts among investors that make servicers reluctant to exercise the
discretionary judgment needed to restructure the underlying mortgage loans, and rating agency conflicts
that might affect the reliability of their ratings. For an analysis of these types of conflicts, see Schwarcz,
Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 2, at 387-88, 392-93, 400-01. The latter category includes
cultural identity conflicts, e.g., Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV.
509 (2008), and conflicts in the ability of executives to contractually alter their legal duties to the firm,
e.g., Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers
Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475 (2007). For a study of the particular sources of law that
regulate conflicts, see, for example, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate
Law: Facilitation and Regulation, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 167 (2005). For studies of whether conflicts in
the process for determining CEO pay fall short of the ideal of an arm's length negotiation and, if so,
what should be done about them, compare LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 213-15 (2004) (arguing
that boards should be made more responsive to shareholders by empowering shareholders to specifically
approve certain "suspect" forms of compensation, to nominate directors, and to initiate changes to the
corporate charter), with Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution to
Excessive CEO Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449 (2007) (questioning whether CEO pay is in fact excessive,
suggesting that CEOs may simply be using their legitimate bargaining power to command high pay, and
arguing that large shareholders should appoint a "compensation representative" to the board to represent
shareholder interests in negotiating executive pay).
7 Cf SEC, STAFF REPORT: ENHANCING DISCLOSURE IN THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
MARKETS (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/mortgagebacked.htm (reporting that investors in
mortgage-backed and other securities are "overwhelmingly" financial institutions).
8 For example, if secondary-manager compensation in a large drug company is based on
bringing new drugs to market, secondary managers would have an incentive to minimize reporting to
senior management about a new drug's possible, latent long-term side effects-a scenario that has
certain parallels to secondary managers of a large financial institution not fully reporting to senior
management the long-term market risk exposure of a particular financial product. Cf infra notes 10-13
and accompanying text (describing that latter scenario).
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I. Analysis
A. The Nature of the Conflict
The conflict centers on compensation. Secondary managers are typically
compensated for performing their assigned tasks, without regard to the long-
term consequences of the tasks to their firms.9 For example, secondary
managers who structure, sell, or invest in market securities on behalf of a firm
are customarily compensated for those tasks even if, ultimately, the structure
proves inadequate or the securities turn out to be poor investments.
10
This conflict can create perverse incentives. For example, as the VaR, or
value-at-risk, model for measuring investment-portfolio risk became more
accepted, financial firms began compensating secondary managers not only for
generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, as measured by
VaR.11 Secondary managers therefore turned to investment products with low
VaR risk profiles, like credit-default swaps that generate small gains but only
rarely have losses.' 2 The managers knew, but did not always exl lain to their
seniors, that any losses that might eventually occur would be huge.
Why, then, are secondary managers typically compensated without regard
to long-term consequences of their performance? One reason is that secondary
managers are subject to supervision and management control by top
managers,' 4 who in turn are subject to the direction of the board of directors.
Top managers therefore are supposedly responsible for ensuring, and thus
9 John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1105 n.13 (1977); Flora Guidry et
al., Earnings-Based Bonus Plans and Earnings Management by Business-Unit Managers, 26 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 113, 113-15, 140 (1999); see also M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term
Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1482-83 (1985) (explaining that managers may have incentives to pursue short-
term gains).
10 Liam Pleven & Susanne Craig, Deal Fees Under Fire amid Mortgage Crisis, WSJ.COM,
Jan. 18, 2008, http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/mortgages/200801 18-
pleven.html?mod=RSSRealEstate_Joumal&rejrss=frontpage. A secondary manager who structures a
deal, for example, may be compensated based on the fee generated by that deal. Charles Gasparino,
Analysts' Contracts Link Pay to Deal Work, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2002, at Cl; see also ROBERT G.
ECCLES & DWIGHT B. CRANE, DOING DEALS: INVESTMENT BANKS AT WORK 173-75 (1988) (describing
analysts' deal-based bonuses).
I 1 Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009 (Magazine), at 24, 26, 46.
12 The VaR model typically excluded losses that have less than a one percent (or, in some
cases, five percent) likelihood of occurring within the model's limited time frame. Id. at 46.
13 Id.; cf Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1492 (1993) (arguing that a
"person engaged in derivatives operations may emphasize rewards and downplay risks" because of the
income incentives).
14 Cf supra note 5 and accompanying text (observing that this same rationale appears to
explain why scholars have largely ignored conflicts of interest between a firm and its secondary
managers).
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monitoring, that the tasks performed by secondary managers take into account
long-term consequences to the firm. 15
The recent financial crisis has graphically demonstrated, though, that the
conflict sometimes causes secondary managers to act in ways that create
adverse long-term consequences to their firms, despite top management
monitoring and supervision. The next part of this Essay examines why.
B. Complexity Causes Overreliance on Signals, Making the Conflict Worse
Why does monitoring and supervision by top management fail to prevent
secondary managers from acting in conflict with their firms? I believe the
answer is rooted in the increasing complexity of financial markets and of
market securities, 16 which causes overreliance on signals. 17 Such overreliance,
in turn, worsens the conflict, making secondary managers more likely to act on
the conflict and also making it difficult for top managers to monitor secondary-
management action properly.' 
8
Complexity causes overreliance on signals. Consider first why complexity
causes overreliance on signals. In the face of complexity, human beings often
resort to simplifying heuristics.' 9 For example, even though people reach
maturity by different ages, the legal age for alcohol purchase in the United
States is fixed at twenty-one for everyone. The heuristic here, or the rule of
thumb, is that by the age of twenty-one a person is able to consume alcohol
responsibly. In the context of structuring, selling, or investing in complex
15 Although top managers who themselves might have conflicts with the firm should not, in
theory, be conflicted regarding their managerial obligations to restrain secondary-management conflicts,
the conflicts sometimes could coincide. See, e.g., E-mail from William W. Bratton, Peter P.
Weidenbruch, Jr. Professor of Bus. Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., to author (Dec. 28, 2008, 02:48
PM EST) (on file with author) ("The [compensation] incentives [for secondary and top management]
haven't been much different in the recent [business] environment.").
16 For an analysis of this increasing complexity, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 11-24, on
file with the Yale Journal on Regulation) [hereinafter, Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity].
17 See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing overreliance on signals
represented by rating-agency ratings and mathematical models).
18 1 believe that overreliance on signals due to conflicts between a firm and its secondary
managers can also explain failures of the recent financial crisis that have been attributable to other
causes. For example, many commentators attribute the lowered investing standards to the originate-and-
distribute model of mortgage loan origination. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of
Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1300928) [hereinafter Schwarcz, The Future of
Securitization]. I believe, in contrast, that the same overreliance described above explains why firms
invested in investment-grade rated mortgage-backed securities originated by others.
19 See, e.g., Anuj K. Shah & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-
Reduction Framework, PSYCHOL. BULL., Mar., 2006, at 207 (explaining behavioral psychology
experiment demonstrating when individuals employ heuristics); see also Cass R. Sunstein, A Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1997) (discussing biases and heuristics in the legal context).
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market securities, these heuristics include the "signals" provided by rating-
agency ratings and by mathematical models.
20
As the discussion below shows, such reliance-or "overreliance," because
the signal is an imperfect indicator of the underlying complexity-can worsen
the conflict between a firm and its secondary managers by making such
managers more likely to act in conflict with the firm and also by making it
difficult for top managers to monitor secondary-management action adequately.
Overreliance makes secondary managers more likely to act in conflict
with their firms. Because secondary managers are compensated for performing
specific tasks without regard to long-term consequences to the firm,2 1 they are
tempted to take a relatively short-term view when performing tasks. This
temptation makes secondary managers especially likely to overrely on signals,
particularly when the signals align their performance with their economic2
benefit. Overreliance then makes those managers more likely to act in conflict
with their firms.
In the recent financial crisis, for example, secondary managers overrelied
on signals, in the form of rating-agency ratings and mathematical models,
which aligned secondary-manager performance and economic benefit. Thus,
"[a] lot of institutional investors bought [mortgage-backed] securities
substantially based on their ratings [without fully understanding what they
bought], in part because the market has become so complex."2 3 Similarly, there
"was an enormous faith in the market's ability to analyze and measure risk"
through mathematical models.
24
That overreliance by secondary managers was clearly in conflict with the
long-term interests of their firms. Although ratings provide a useful yardstick
by which to compare the safety of a debt security, ratings are imperfect
measures, not even taking into account the possibility of fraud. In the recent
financial crisis, many mortgage-backed securities turned out to be incorrectly
26rated. Similarly, although mathematical models can bring insight and clarity if
20 See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 9-10.
22 1 am not claiming, nor do I necessarily believe, that most secondary managers fraudulently
or even consciously will act contrary to their firms' long-term interests.
23 Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Credit & Blame: How Rating Firms' Calls Fueled Subprime
Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A 10. For a discussion of rating agencies and their ratings, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. I [hereinafter Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets].
24 Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard 23 (Oct. 30, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text
(discussing reliance on the VaR model).
25 Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets, supra note 23, at 6 (observing that rating
agencies do not rate for fraud).
26 See, e.g., Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economics
Crisis: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, I10th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Eugene Ludwig, Chief Executive Officer, Promontory Financial Group); see also Eugene
A. Ludwig, Remarks at International Conference of Banking Supervisors (Sept. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.promontory.com/assets/0/78/1 10/112/79f60323-36f6-4983-babd-61274c I 7c373.pdf.
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the model is realistic and the inputted data are reliable, they can be misleading
if the model is unrealistic or the inputted data are unreliable.2 7 In the recent
financial crisis, it was not only the VaR model that was misleading; 28 the cash-
flow models underlying many mortgage-backed securities also were misleading
because they relied on incorrect assumptions and data.
29
Overreliance makes it difficult for top managers to monitor secondary-
management action adequately. Overreliance also makes it difficult for top
managers to monitor secondary-management action adequately. In the face of
complexity, top managers, like secondary managers, will be tempted to
overrely on simplifying heuristics, like the signals provided by ratings and
mathematical models. Although top managers will not be as likely as secondary
managers to overrely due to conflicts, top managers might overrely for another
reason: where the task being performed is highly technical, top managers will
know less, and thus find the task more complex, than would secondary
managers.
Consider this Essay's example of a secondary manager who structures,
sells, or invests in complex market securities on behalf of his firm. This
manager typically will have considerable technical training or experience
regarding the securities. 30 Yet even with that training and experience, he
probably will not completely understand everything about those securities. 3'
The top manager supervising him is likely to know even less, though. If,
therefore, the secondary manager recommends that the firm invest in a given
32
amount of those securities rated investment-Fade, the top manager will have
little basis to veto that recommendation. Similarly, top managers will
probably have little expertise to go beyond VaR or other mathematically
modeled risk profiles.
34
27 Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, supra note 18.
28 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
29 Ludwig, supra note 26, at 3 (observing that now "it is widely accepted" that these models
relied on "insufficient data and faulty assumptions").
30 For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics suggests that the minimum level of academic
training for financial managers is a "bachelor's degree in finance, accounting, or a related field." Bureau
of Lab. Stat., Occupational Outlook Handbook, Financial Managers (2008-09 ed.),
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos0O.htm.
31 See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 16.
32 The term "investment grade" was originally used by various regulatory bodies in the
United States to connote obligations eligible for investment by banks, insurance companies, and other
financial institutions. Over time, this term gained widespread acceptance throughout the investment
community. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets, supra note 23, at 7-8.
33 This assumes, of course, that the interest rate on those securities is roughly commensurate
with the investment grade rating.
34 Cf Nocera, supra note 11, at 46 (claiming that the VaR model obscured from senior
managers the extent of potential future liability from CDS products).
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The complexity of modem financial markets, and resulting overreliance
on signals such as ratings and models, thus makes it difficult for top managers
to monitor secondary-management action adequately.
C. Financial Leverage Exacerbates Problems Caused by Overreliance
This Essay so far has demonstrated that the increasing complexity of
financial markets and the securities traded therein makes secondary managers
more likely to act in conflict with interests of their firms. I now show that the
increasing financial leverage of firms in the modem credit economy
exacerbates the consequences of these conflicts.
Increased financial leverage means that a firm will be less financially
robust. Absent leverage, a firm "can absorb losses linearly, dollar for dollar."
35
The less leverage, the less likely it is, other factors being equal, that a firm
would fail to pay its debts as they mature. 36 When a firm is highly leveraged,
though, losses beyond a certain level-depending on the firm's size and
leverage-will precipitously degrade its ability to pay its debts. 37 Therefore, if
a highly leveraged firm suffers significant losses because of the conflict with its
secondary managers-as happened to many financial institutions in the recent
financial crisis 3 8-the firm may well default.
39
The consequences of the conflict can go even further. Increasing leverage
increases the risk that one firm's failure will systemically trigger failures not
only of other highly leveraged, and thus less financially robust, firms but also
of markets themselves. 4° This too occurred in the recent financial crisis. In part
because of conflicts between financial institutions and their secondary
managers, many financial institutions invested in substantial amounts of risky
but investment-grade-rated mortgage-backed securities. 4 1 When some of these
35 Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 223.
36 Id. at 224.
37 Id.
38 See Keith Darcy, Banking on the American Dream, FIN. SERVICES TECH., Sept. 2008,
available at http://www.usfst.com/article/Issue-9/Risk-Management-AND-BCDR/Banking-on-the-
American-Dream/ (discussing losses throughout the financial industry due to conflicts of interest);
Lehman Notes Investigation: Vernon Healy Law Firm Files First Arbitration Claim Against UBS on
Behalf of Investor Who Purchased Lehman Notes Sold by UBS, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 27, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&refer--conews&tkr-LEH%3AUS&sid=aYnL
Gv5JNrzk (describing a filed arbitration claim asserting that a conflict of interest led UBS to
recommend investments that led to large losses).
39 Lehman Brothers defaulted, for example, and was forced to declare bankruptcy. Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al. AIG
likely would have defaulted without government intervention. Matthew Kamitschnig et al., U.S. To Take
Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2008, at AI.
40 See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 224.
41 See Schwarcz, Understanding the 'Subprime' Financial Crisis, supra note 1. These
conflicts between financial institutions and their secondary managers resembled those discussed supra
notes 10-13 and accompanying text: secondary managers who knew that investments in these mortgage-
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securities started defaulting or being downgraded because of defaults on
underlying subprime mortgage loans, investors started losing confidence in
ratings and avoiding debt securities as investments. 42 With fewer investors, the
price of debt securities started falling, which in turn required firms using debt
securities as collateral to mark them to market and put up cash.43 Firms had to
sell more securities to raise the cash, causing market prices to plummet even
further downward in a death spiral. 44 The collapse in market prices meant that
banks and other financial institutions holding mortgage-backed securities had
to write down their value, causing these highly leveraged institutions to appear
even more financially risky, in turn triggering concern over counterparty risk:
parties were afraid these institutions might default on their contractual
obligations and therefore stopped dealing with them.45 As a result, the credit
markets shut down, severely impacting the real economy.
46
D. Finding Solutions
The analysis above has shown that conflicts of interest between firms and
their secondary managers are no longer harmless. To the contrary, increasing
leverage and financial complexity make these conflicts dangerous to both firms
and financial markets. This Essay next examines possible solutions.
Limiting conflicts. The most direct way to limit conflicts in our case is by
aligning incentives. Because compensation is at the root of the conflict between
firms and their secondary managers, the most effective way to align incentives
is to tie secondary-manager compensation to long-term interests of the firm.
This could be done in various ways.
For example, a firm might retroactively recover ("clawback")
compensation paid to secondary managers who have structured, sold, or
invested in market securities on behalf of the firm if, within some time period,
the structure proves inadequate or the securities turn out to be poor
investments. 47 Similarly, a firm might pay a portion of a secondary manager's
backed securities were risky did not always explain the full extent of the risk to their seniors, who
overrelied on the investment-grade ratings of the securities.





47 Cf Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REv. 1, 7 (2007) (proposing that firms
enact aggressive "clawback" provisions to keep CEOs accountable); Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 11 l(b)(2)(B) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(2)(B))
(proposing clawback of compensation for a firm's five most highly paid executives). This approach
would not work if a secondary manager receives such large amounts of compensation that, even if a
portion can be clawed back, the manager will be financially independent of the firm. It is unlikely,
though not impossible, that secondary managers will receive such high compensation.
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compensation contingently over time or in the form of equity securities with
long-term lock-down constraints on selling the securities.48 The amount of
compensation subject to clawback or paid contingently or in equity must be
material enough in context to affect secondary-management incentives. In
determining that amount, a firm will have to take into account, of course, how
the deferred, contingent, or equity compensation will affect the firm's ability to
compete for the best secondary managers. A firm also should consider timing.
Too short a time frame may not sufficiently align long-term incentives, whereas
too long a time frame may run into the "availability bias": individuals
overestimate the importance of events that are imminent, such as receiving a
portion of the compensation now, and underestimate events that are remote,
such as contingently receiving compensation in the future.49
Any such alignment of compensation incentives with long-term interests
of the firm would also have to address the compensation of top managers
supervising the secondary managers. Although top management should be
responsible for monitoring and ensuring that the tasks performed by secondary
managers take into account long-term consequences to the firm,50 top managers
themselves may have conflicts that induce them to ignore those long-term
consequences. 5For example, a top manager supervising a secondary manager
may get paid based on the firm's (or a business group's) short-term
52profitability, which is materially driven by the secondary manager's work. In
these cases, top management compensation should also be aligned with the
finn's long-term interests-at least insofar as top management conflicts could
undermine monitoring of secondary management.
48 E-mail from William W. Bratton to author, supra note 15 (suggesting paying secondary
managers partly through equity; and observing that although long-term lock-downs on selling the equity
would not have prevented the recent financial crisis, that strategy "would have imported some risk
aversion and so would not have hurt").
49 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269, 294-95 (2004) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982)); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1188 (observing that people tend to think
that risks are more serious when an incident is readily called to mind or "available").
50 See supra text accompanying note 15.
51 Cf Michael Lewis & David Einhom, Op-Ed., The End of the Financial World As We Know
It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9 (discussing the "tyranny of the short term"); supra note 15 and
accompanying text (observing that although top managers who themselves might have conflicts with the
firm should not, in theory, be conflicted regarding their managerial obligations to restrain secondary-
management conflicts, the conflicts sometimes could coincide).
52 Former top AIG executives describe Joseph Cassano, the president of A1G-FP, the AIG
affiliate that brought AIG down through its credit-default-swap trading, as a person who was making a
fortune on those swaps and who resisted AIG audits. See Panel I1 of a Hearing of the House Oversight
and Government Reform Committee on the Cause and Effects of the AIG Bailout Before the H.
Oversight and Government Reform Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (reported in Fed. News Service, Oct. 7
(2008)).
53 This Essay does not engage the larger issue of how top manager compensation should be
aligned with shareholder interests. For discussion of that issue, compare BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note
6 (arguing that top managers can use existing governance structures to obtain excessively high incentive
pay, and that shareholders should be empowered to prevent this), with Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
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Another way a firm can align incentives is to announce a policy to
terminate secondary managers who structure market securities that later prove
inadequate or who sell or invest in market securities that later turn out to be
poor investments. This approach, however, may not be as effective as aligning
compensation incentives. Individuals overestimate the importance of imminent
events, such as having a job and being paid a bonus, and underestimate events
that are remote, such as the possibility of being fired at a future date.
54
Individuals in industries with high job turnover may even expect to be at
different jobs before the success of an investment is likely to be known.55
Furthermore, secondary managers may feel, and in fact be, secure from being
fired if many similarly situated secondary managers are acting the same way.
In the recent financial crisis, for example, secondary managers often
recommended investments in highly complex mortgage-backed securities they
did not fully understand,57 apparently feeling safe in following the herd.
Conflicts also can be limited by better monitoring. 58 This might include
better monitoring by top management. 59 It also might include, for example,
hiring technically trained "control" officers who do not have conflicts to
supervise relevant aspects of the quality of tasks performed by secondary
managers. 60 This could be very expensive, though, because any control officer
so hired would face the prospect of losing expertise over time.
6Y
Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. EcON. 225 (1990) (arguing for
equity-based compensation of top management). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Book Review Essay,
Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615 (2005) (reviewing this controversy);
William W. Bratton, Book Review, The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL.
L. REv. 1557 (2005) (same).
54 Cf sources cited supra note 49 (discussing how individuals view different time horizons).
55 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004
U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 14 (observing that analysts who have jobs with limited time horizons may have low
accountability).
56 Cf id. at 14 (discussing findings by Paul M. Healy and Krishna Palepu that investment-
fund managers who, believing a stock is overvalued, nonetheless follow the crowd will not be blamed if
the stock ultimately crashes).
57 Schwarcz, Understanding the 'Subprime' Financial Crisis, supra note 1.
58 Cf Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 128 (2009)
("[D]ebilitating losses at many financial institutions in the wake of the current credit crisis.., have been
blamed to a large extent... on lax internal controls and oversight . .
59 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
60 This type of supervision is very common in accounting firms, for example. See, e.g.,
Lawrence A. Poneman, Practicing Public Accounting in an Unlicensed, Unregulated Environment,
C.P.A. J., Aug. 1996, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1996/0896/public82f96.htm
(discussing the need for internal controls, including "adequate supervision" and "review of work," to
address conflicts within accounting firms).
61 Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 55, at 14-15 (observing that
even a technically trained analyst will lose expertise over time if no longer employed doing market
deals). Based on his experience as a former law-firm partner, the author observes, albeit as an imperfect
analogy, that the most highly respected partners of law firms typically serve from time to time on an
opinions committee to monitor their peer partners when giving legal opinions on behalf of the firm-
perhaps a firm's most sensitive area of exposure to liability. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The
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Improving the accuracy of signals. Yet another way to help mitigate the
conflict of interest between a firm and its secondary managers might be to try
to improve the accuracy of signals, such as rating-agency ratings or risk
models. The viability of this type of approach would be highly fact-dependent.
This approach also might have unintended consequences. If the accuracy
of a signal is not improved as much as the perception of the signal's accuracy,
overreliance may actually increase. For example, if ratings are perceived to be
highly accurate and no longer subject to exceptions (like fraud), secondary
managers will rely even more on ratings. But if the accuracy of ratings has not
increased commensurately to the perception, they will be overrelying.
62
Remember that the widespread acceptance of the VaR model for assessing risk
contributed to management overreliance.
63
Should solutions be market-driven or regulatory? It therefore appears that
the most effective way to address the conflict between firms and their
secondary managers is to align secondary-management compensation
incentives with the long-term interests of the firm. To what extent should this
be left to the market, and to what extent should it be imposed by regulation?
Firms clearly are in a better position than government regulators to
determine how best to align secondary-management compensation incentives
with their long-term interests.64 Furthermore, firms will want to align those
incentives for their own long-term survival.65 There may, however, be a
collective-action problem that individual firms will be unable to solve: any firm
that employs a deferred or contingent (or equity) compensation scheme will be
disadvantaged in its ability to compete for the best secondary managers.
66
Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1, 9-14 (2005) (describing
legal opinions). Because partners on opinions committees usually devote only a small portion of their
time to that task, their transactional expertise is not generally impaired. This raises the question whether
highly respected secondary managers of financial firms might serve the same type of function, at least
for selected secondary-management decisions. One important distinction, though, is that law-firm
partners-who have made substantial investments in their firms and who may well be personally
responsible, if the firm fails, for firm liabilities such as rent and bank debt-are likely to be much more
concerned than secondary managers about their firm's viability. To some extent, perhaps, this distinction
might be partially bridged by specially compensating secondary managers of corporations who serve in
this capacity.
62 In this context, query the extent to which ratings that are perceived as imperfect create
incentives for investor monitoring. Cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 902-03 (1996) (explaining that a secured
creditor with full priority has less incentive to monitor the borrower's behavior).
63 Nocera, supra note 11, at 46 (discussing management overreliance on VaR).
64 Consider which constituents of a firm would be motivated to impose these solutions.
Shareholders and creditors are the parties whose interests in a firm would be primarily affected by its
collapse. Cf 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a), 1129(a)(7)-(a)(8) (2006) (taking into account only holders of"claims"
(creditors) and holders of "interests" (shareholders) in the bankruptcy process, although a firm's collapse
can indirectly affect an even wider community of interests). They therefore would be the parties with the
greatest incentive to impose solutions-by shareholders presumably through the types of directors
elected and any organizational restrictions placed on management, and by creditors through covenants.
65 Cf Krawiec, supra note 58.
66 See text accompanying supra note 49.
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Government action may well be needed to help resolve this collective-action
problem.
The question of whether these solutions should be market-driven or
regulatory can also be viewed more broadly as a subset of the debate over
regulating operational risk. Operational risk is term used to describe, among
other things, the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal
processes, people, and systems67-and thus it would encompass the secondary-
management conflicts discussed in this Essay.
Many observers believe that enforced self-regulation is the best way to
68handle operational risk. But others argue that the answer is more nuanced.
Kimberly Krawiec, for example, contends that for low-frequency, high-impact
events, enforced self-regulation of operational risk is worse than no regulation
at all because it lures parties into a false sense of confidence while costing
money.
69
Although this debate provides an interesting way to frame the regulatory
question, it is far from determinative. Risks arising from the conflict between a
firm and its secondary managers are difficult to categorize as either low-
frequency, high-impact-for which self-regulation is arguably inappropriate-
or high-frequency, low-impact-for which self-regulation may well be more
appropriate.
A final question is whether regulation, if adopted, should apply to all
firms, including the large, sophisticated firms that, under the federal securities
laws in the United States, are characterized as qualified institutional buyers
(QIBs).70 The securities laws generally assume that QIBs can and will protect
their own interests-or at least their own investments. 71 Anomalously, though,
QIBs are the very investors who lost the most money in the recent financial
crisis, much of it through bad investing. 72 Any exclusion of QIBs from
regulation would first have to explain that anomaly. 73 Furthermore, because
QIBs would be as subject to the collective-action problem as any other firms,74
any regulation addressing that problem should equally apply to them.
67 Krawiec, supra note 58, at 880, 884.
68 See id. at 880 and accompanying footnotes.
69 Id. at 881,883.
70 QIBs are firms having more than $100 million in the aggregate owned and invested in
securities on a discretionary basis (or $10 million in securities with respect to dealers). 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A
(2008).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Wall St. Banks Confront a String of Write-Downs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2008, at Cl ("[M]ajor banks... have already written off more than $120 billion of losses
stemming from bad mortgage-related investments."); Randall Smith, Merrill's $5 Billion Bath Bares
Deeper Divide-After Big Write-Down Tied to Mortgage Debt, O'Neal Asserts Control, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 2007, at Al (reporting a total of $20 billion in write-downs by large investment banks).
73 Consider, for example, to what extent, if any, this anomaly reflects the tragedy of the
commons inherent in systemic risk. See supra note I.
74 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing the collective-action problem).
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III. Conclusion
This Essay focuses on rising agency costs associated with increasing
complexity of financial markets and the securities traded therein and increasing
leverage of firms in the modem credit economy. Increasing complexity makes
it more likely that secondary managers will act in conflict with interests of their
firms. Increasing leverage amplifies returns but, because it makes firms more
susceptible to default, it also heightens the risk for losses from these conflicts.
Scholars generally disregarded these conflicts in the traditional non-credit
economy because the associated agency costs were relatively small.75 In a
highly leveraged firm, these agency costs can be large. Indeed, in the recent
financial crisis, they contributed to the failure of financial institutions and the
collapse of financial markets, resulting in massive losses. Conflict-of-interest
oversight of secondary managers thus matters much more today than it did in
the past.
The Essay argues that the most effective way to address the conflict is to
align secondary-management compensation incentives with the long-term
interests of the firm. Firms have incentives, and are in a better position than
government regulators, to determine how best to achieve this alignment.
Regulation may well be needed, though, to help resolve the collective-action
problem that individual firms that attempt to align incentives will be
disadvantaged in their ability to compete for the best secondary managers.
76
75 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. But cf supra note 8 (observing that secondary-
management conflicts could have significant consequences even in the traditional non-credit economy).
76 This Essay is normative and does not engage the question of whether secondary managers
whose conflicted decisions ultimately led to losses in the recent financial crisis, or top managers
supervising those secondary managers, should be liable under existing law for such losses. Any
resolution to that question would have to take into account, among other things, such matters as
causation and foreseeability. It seems unlikely, however, that one reasonably could foresee the sequence
of events described in supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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